Equity market liberalizations allow foreign investors to acquire ownership stakes in domestic …rms. Previous research on the real impact of these events has therefore emphasized the interactions between …rms and investors. This paper shows that cross-border equity ‡ows also improve buyers-suppliers relationships with positive rami…cations for economic growth. Firstly, a buyer backed by foreign capital means a smaller probability of contract failure due to default or some liquidity problems. Secondly, liberalization-driven improvements in public and corporate governance decrease the risk of a deliberate breach of contract. Cross-border equity ‡ows can thus reassure upstream …rms about the …nancial stability and contractual reliability of their corporate customers. Results from panel data and event-study approach con…rm that equity market liberalizations boost output growth particularly in industries dependent on the trust of their suppliers, establishing a novel channel from …nancial globalization to the real economy.
Introduction
The event of equity market liberalization occurs when the government allows foreign subjects to acquire equity securities issued by the domestic …rms. The research on real e¤ects of these liberalization events has so far focused on the relations between …rms and external investors.
However, cross-border equity ‡ows can also have a strong impact on the interplay among corporate agents within the realm of real economy. The case in point, stressed in this paper, is the ultimate need of the downstream …rms to gain the trust of the suppliers who provide them with the neccessary intermediate inputs. The input producers have a natural interest in receiving payments for the goods that they manufactured or already delivered to their corporate customers. Financial stability of the downstream …rms therefore matters to the suppliers, as it a¤ects buyers'ability to pay. Suppliers also care about contractual reliability of their corporate customers, because it a¤ects buyers'willingness to pay. The main point of this paper is that equity market liberalizations and their rami…cations help to reassure suppliers about the …nancial stability and contractual reliability of their buyers. This leads to smoother relationships between upstream and downstream …rms with positive e¤ects for the overall economic growth.
Let us …rst turn to the issue of …nancial stability of the downstream …rms. After the event of market equity liberalization, domestic …rms gain access to a new source of funding in form of foreign capital. Foreign-owned equity also makes …rms more resilient to possible crises. In a di¤erent context of domestic …nancial development, Strieborny and Kukenova (2011) have already shown that signalling …nancial robustness is especially important in industries where …rms need to reassure their suppliers.
Regarding contractual reliability, opening up to the foreign capital ‡ows increases bene…ts and decreases costs of investment into improved corporate governance by the domestic agents who control the …rms, being it managers or owners (Stulz, 2005; Doidge et al., 2007) .
The presence of foreign investors in the country also increases pressure on the government and regulatory agencies to improve the quality of public governance and strengthen institutions like rule of law (Stulz, 2005; Morck et al., 2005) . High governance and institutional standards in turn help to prevent the occurrence of deliberate breaches of contracts and refusals to pay by the downstream purchasers of intermediate products. The liberalizationdriven improvements in the area of public and corporate governance can therefore reassure the suppliers about the contractual reliability of the buyers. Building upon the Nobel-prize winning work of Oliver Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1979 , the recent trade literature (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007) documents the importance of the public governance for the buyers-suppliers relationships. These two seminal papers show that quality of public institutions and contract enforcement particularly bene…ts suppliers-dependent industries with positive rami…cations for the exporting performance of the countries.
The above argumentation presents equity market liberalizations as an instrument to reassure the upstream …rms about the ability and willingness of their downstream corporate customers to honour the agreed contractual commitments. This yields a clear and testable 3 empirical implication: Equity market liberalizations should disproportionately bene…t those …rms that particularly depend on the full trust of their suppliers. I examine this hypothesis using the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) in the context of equity liberalizations.
In particular, I interact equity liberalization dummy with a proxy measuring the importance of smooth and trusting relationships with the suppliers for given industry. The proxy comes from Nunn (2007) and is based on the classi…cation by Rauch (1999) . It measures for every industry the proportion of intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange nor are reference-priced in trade publications. In the absence of an organized exchange or a reference price, the supplier would …nd it di¢ cult to sell the product at the original price if the initial buyer turned out to be unable or unwilling to pay. Consequently, a forward-looking supplier would be particularly reluctant to produce such an intermediate good unless she is reassured about the …nancial stability and contractual reliability of the buyer. A lack of required inputs would naturally disturb the production process of the downstream …rms. The share of inputs without organized exchange or reference price thus captures how dependent is the production of the …rms in a given industry on the full trust of the suppliers.
Both panel data estimation and event studies approach con…rm that equity liberalizations disproportionately promote industries that depend on the suppliers'trust. This e¤ect seems even to dominate the traditional mechanism about …nancial liberalization promoting industries dependent on external investors. Following Gupta and Yuan (2009) and Levchenko et al. (2009) , I also interact the dummy of equity liberalization with the dependence of given industry on external …nance. These authors …nd a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of this interaction on economic growth, a¢ rming the disproportionate impact of equity liberalizations on industries requiring a lot of external …nance. My estimations con…rm their result.
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However, when both interactions enter the regressions, it is mostly only the term capturing the bene…cial e¤ect of equity liberalization on suppliers-dependent industries that remains signi…cant.
These results establish a novel channel from …nancial globalization to the real economy.
The in ‡uential scholarly work on equity liberalizations already established a strong empirical case for the overall bene…cial e¤ect of cross-border equity ‡ows on private investment (Henry, 2000a ) and economic growth (Bekaert et al., 2005) 
Methodology

Panel Data Speci…cations
In order to identify the di¤erential impact of equity market liberalizations across industries, I interact a liberalization dummy (EL ct ) with variables capturing the technological dependence of given industry on suppliers (S i ) and external investors (I i ). I examine these two channels …rst separately, but ultimately allow both interaction terms to enter simultaneously the following speci…cation:
where the dependent variable is economic growth in industry i, country c, and year t. Coe¢ cient 0 captures the direct e¤ect of equity market liberalizations on economic growth.
The speci…cation also includes initial share of industry i in overall output of country c at the beginning of year t. This variable (Share ict ) controls for the fact that more mature industries usually exhibit lower growth rates. Full sets of industry-country ( ic ) and time In Equation (1), country characteristics that change over time could bias the coe¢ cients of included variables. One way to address this issue would be to include the "usual suspects"
into the regression. In this regard, Gupta and Yuan (2009) control for openness to trade, GDP per capita, human capital, and domestic …nancial development. However, some less obvious country-speci…c factors might still shape the complex relationship between equity liberalizations and economic growth. This argument applies especially in the context of this paper. In particular, Equation (1) tests a novel hypothesis (EL ct S i ), while at the same time controlling for a quite di¤erent channel from the existing literature (EL ct I i ). For this reason, I also estimate the following speci…cation:
where a full set of country-time …xed e¤ects ( ct ) replaces time dummies from equation (1).
This stringent speci…cation thus controls for all possible time-varying country characteristics 7 that could in more or less obvious ways a¤ect economic growth. The direct e¤ect of equity liberalizations (EL ct ) is also captured by ct .
Event-Study Approach
Event-study approach o¤ers another way to account for various factors that might obfuscate transmission channels from equity liberalizations to economic growth. This methodology has gained broad popularity in the empirical trade literature, going back to the seminal paper by Equation (1):
where t = 0 (t = 1) refers to the time before (after) equity liberalization takes place.
In particular, G ic0 (G ic1 ) corresponds to average growth in three years before (after) the liberalization event. Consequently, a positive value of G ict would document an acceleration in economic growth due to such event. First-di¤erencing also removes country-industry …xed e¤ects ( ic ) from the regression, providing a cleaner estimate of a causal impact of equity liberalizations (Manova 2008, p. 41 ). The stringent event-study speci…cation places high requirements on data to reveal any signi…cant impact of liberalization events. The number of data points available for identi…cation is much lower than in standard panel data estimation,
as Equation (3) uses only one observation for every country-industry pair. The speci…cation also controls for the year in which the liberalization event took place ( T ).
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Finally, the dummy character of the liberalization variable (EL ct ) implies EL ct = EL c1 EL c0 = 1. Equation (3) thus simpli…es to:
with EL ct not directly entering the speci…cation. Nevertheless, the economic interpretation of main coe¢ cients remains unchanged. Positive estimated coe¢ cients 1 and 2 would still imply a disproportionately bene…cial impact of equity liberalizations on industries highly dependent on suppliers (S i ) and external investors (I i ), respectively. Coe¢ cient on the constant term, 0 , captures the direct e¤ect of EL ct .
Data
The industrial output data for economic growth (G ict ) and initial industry share (Share ict )
come from the Trade, Production, and Protection Database by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) , based on the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 classi…cation. The ultimate source of production data in this database is the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). I transform data from current U.S. dollars into constant international dollars using GDP de ‡ator from Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002 ).
An important issue in the outlined identi…cation strategy is to …nd suitable proxies for industrial characteristics (S i ) and (I i ). This paper utilizes the notion of relationship-speci…c investment to capture the importance of suppliers'trust for given industry (S i ). A supplier often needs to make investments in order to customize intermediate products for speci…c needs of a particular buyer. After such speci…c investment is sunk, the buyer can refuse to pay the agreed price and try to renegotiate. Furthermore, even if the buyer would be willing to pay for a product at the agreed price, she might be not able to do so due to liquidity or solvency problems. A supplier of standardized products can easily …nd another buyer if the original customer is either not able or not willing to honour her commitment. A supplier of relationship-speci…c products would be in a much worse position. She already adjusted the product for the needs of one speci…c purchaser and would thus not be able to achieve the original price with a di¤erent customer. Consequently, forward-looking sellers suspecting opportunistic behavior or …nancial instability on the part of their business partners would refuse to execute the required product adjustments in the …rst place, hurting the downstream …rms with negative rami…cations for aggregate growth.
The most prominent measure of relationship-speci…c investment was arguably introduced already accounts for a high share in the country's overall output. The negative direct e¤ect of EL ct is somewhat surprising, but following tables related to more stringent speci…cations will address this issue.
Empirical Results
The second column of the Table 1 [ Table 1 about here] Table 2 reports the results of the more stringent speci…cation (2). Country-time …xed e¤ects ( ct ) now capture all observable and unobservable country characteristics that change over time. Thus, they also absorb the direct e¤ect of equity liberalizations (EL ct ). The …rst three columns report the results based on the o¢ cial dates of equity liberalizations.
Column (1) presents the regression result from the full sample of countries. Columns (2) and (3) rely on subsamples of developing and developed countries, respectively. Broadly speaking, developed countries are non-transition and non-emerging economies among the OECD members. Appendices A1 and A2 provide the details. Columns (4) to (6) repeat the estimations from the …rst three columns, while using the dates of …rst liberalization signs to construct liberalization dummy (EL ct ).
Overall, Table 2 con…rms the patterns from the previous table. Equity liberalizations disproportionately bene…t industries heavily dependent either on their suppliers or external investors, as captured by positive estimated coe¢ cients for EL ct S i and EL ct I i , respectively.
In …ve out of six cases, the e¤ect is signi…cant for the suppliers-dependent sectors, but not for the investor-dependent ones. This pattern reverses only in the last column, reporting the e¤ect of …rst liberalization signs in the sample of developed countries.
[ Table 2 about here]
The results in Tables 1 and 2 14 The positive impact of equity liberalizations on industries relying on external investors is stronger in the group of liberalizing countries (Table 3 ) than in the whole sample ( Table 1) .
The clearly signi…cant positive estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction term EL ct I i , both in second and …fth column of the Table 3 , is now more in accordance with the results reported in Gupta and Yuan (2009) . This is not surprising, as their sample consists mostly of the liberalizers. In particular, 27 out of 31 countries examined in Gupta and Yuan (2009) liberalized equity ‡ows during their sample period. Nevertheless, once both interaction terms are allowed to enter regressions in columns (3) and (6), only the variable capturing the suppliers'importance (EL ct S i ) maintains signi…cance. Focusing on liberalizing countries also provides more intuitive results for the overall e¤ect of equity liberalizations. The direct e¤ect of EL ct is less negative than in Table 1 . Importantly, the overall liberalization e¤ect is positive.
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[ Table 3 about here] Table 4 veri…es the estimations of the stringent speci…cation (2) in the sample of liberalizing countries. The results broadly con…rm the patterns found in Table 2 . The single qualitative deviation relates to subsample of liberalizing developed countries in columns (3) and (6) . Contrary to Table 2 , none of the two interaction terms is signi…cant. However, the speci…cation might simply ask too much from data in this case. Appendix A1 shows that only few developed countries implemented equity liberalizations between 1980 and 1997.
Most of them were open to foreign equity ‡ows during the whole sample period. 2 The overall e¤ect of equity liberalizations can be computed from the estimated coe¢ cients for variables containing the liberalization dummy and from mean values of industry characteristics. For example, the overall liberalization e¤ect in column (3) of Table 3 Table 4 about here] Finally, Table 5 reports the results from estimating Equation (4). This event-study approach places arguably the highest data requirements on the search for a possible impact of equity liberalizations. Columns (1) and (4) use data from all liberalizing countries, while columns (2) and (5) rely on subsample of developing countries. In these four speci…cations, the main variable of interest (S i ) is positive and signi…cant. The direct e¤ect of equity liberalizations ( EL ct ) is either positive or insigni…cant and the overall liberalization e¤ect is clearly bene…cial for the output growth. Positive impact of equity liberalizations on suppliersdependent industries seems to disappear when applying the event-study approach in case of developed countries (columns three and six). Similarly to Table 4 , this result might re ‡ect the small number of liberalizers among the developed countries rather than a smaller impact of foreign equity ‡ows at higher stages of economic development.
[ Table 5 about here]
Conclusions and Further Research
Equity market liberalizations allow foreign investors to acquire shares in the domestic …rms.
Existing literature has therefore naturally focused on the impact of these events on the relationship between …rms and investors. In particular, there is by now a well-established case for equity market liberalizations disproportionately helping those domestic …rms and industries that are highly dependent on the …nancing by external investors. This paper stresses the e¤ect of cross-border equity ‡ows on …rms' relationships with another crucial stakeholder -the suppliers. Firstly, a buyer backed by foreign capital means a smaller probability of contract failure due to default or some liquidity problems. Secondly, liberalization-driven advances in the quality of public and corporate governance decrease the risk of a deliberate breach of contract.
Cross-border equity ‡ows can thus reassure upstream …rms with respect to the …nan-cial stability and contractual reliability of their corporate customers. Consequently, equity market liberalizations should particularly promote those industries where the …rms strongly depend on the full trust of their suppliers. Results from panel data and event-study approach con…rm this hypothesis, establishing a novel transmission channel from …nancial globalization to the real economy. International equity ‡ows seem to play an important role in the interactions among agents in the real economy, rather than a¤ecting the real economy exclusively via improved …rms-investors relationships.
In future work, it would be interesting to explore the relative importance of the two channels from equity market liberalizations to growth of suppliers-dependent industries: increased …nancial stability of the downstream …rms versus improved corporate and public governance implying a better contractual reliability of those …rms. Here the main challenge will be in controlling for di¤erent feedbacks and interactions between the two channels. For one thing, improved corporate governance also makes …rms more resilient to …nancial distress (Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002) . For another thing, the presence of active foreign investors increases the demand for information services such as auditing or …nancial analysis in the economy (Morck et al., 2005, p. 709) . The work of specialized agents like auditors and …nancial analysts not only increases the pressure towards better governance and thus contractual reliability, but it also allows the upstream …rms to better evaluate the …nancial stability of their potential customers.
There is also the question whether majority versus minority foreign ownership plays a signi…cant role. Arguably, a buyer that is an integral part of a multinational corporation would be in an even better position to reassure suppliers, compared to a downstream …rm with a "merely" minority foreign ownership. As existing research has established decades ago, multinational corporations face a lower average probability of insolvency, even when compared to domestic corporations in the developed countries (Shaked, 1986 ). In the sense that equity market liberalizations are often associated with foreign portfolio investment (i.e., acquiring of minority stakes by foreign investors), the results in this paper might constitute only a lower bound for the importance of foreign capital in the buyers-suppliers relationships within domestic economy. The topic thus certainly merits further investigations and augurs an interesting research agenda for the future. The dependent variable is output growth in industry i, country c, and year t. All regressions are estimated by the OLS and include industry-country and time …xed e¤ects. Coe¢ cient for the constant term is not reported. EL c t is indicator variable equal to one if country was in a given year open to foreign equity ‡ows and zero otherwise. S i and I i measure for each industry the importance of suppliers and external investors, respectively. Share ic t is the share of industry i in overall output of country c at the beginning of year t. The …rst three columns use the o¢ cial dates of equity liberalizations and the last three columns use the dates of the …rst liberalization sign. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is output growth acceleration in industry i and country c, following the event of equity liberalization.
Only countries where equity liberalizations occurred during the sample period are included. All regressions are estimated by the OLS and control for the year when liberalization event occurred. The independent variables are de…ned in Table 1 .
Columns 1 and 4 report results for the full sample of the liberalizers. Columns 2 and 5 report results for the subsample of developing countries. Columns 3 and 6 report results for the subsample of developed countries. The …rst three columns use the o¢ cial dates of equity liberalizations and the last three columns use the dates of the …rst liberalization sign. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) 
